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EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: RECONCEIVING THE
ROLE OF THE CHIEF PUBLIC DEFENDER
Kim Taylor-Thompson*

In recent years, scholars have raised critical questions about the role
of public defenders. 1 Some have critiqued the ways that defender offices
function,' and even openly questioned their continuing need. 3 Still
others have examined the visions of defender offices, suggesting that
more coherence in their missions might ultimately serve their clients better in the future.4 But for all their variety, most have presumed that the
compelling issues occur in the direct representation of clients. In limiting
their sphere of analysis, though, they have ignored fundamental questions about an individual who centrally affects the offices' external policies and internal operations: the chief defender.
This is not at all surprising. In the last two decades, chief defenders
have been locked into a narrow managerial role. Instead of actively parProfessor of Clinical Law, New York University School of Law. A.B., Brown University;
J.D., Yale Law School. I appreciate the comments and suggestions that I received from John
Donahue, Randy Hertz, Jerry L6pez. I am also grateful to Greg Chen and Robin Walker for their
research assistance. Special thanks to Anthony Thompson whose community work as a public
defender reoriented my thinking about the role of public defenders.
1. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 175 (1983);
Randy Bellows, Notes of a Public Defender, in PimIu-P B. HEYMANN & LANCE LIEBMAN, THE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES (1988); JAMES S. KUNEN, "How CAN You
DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE?": THE MAKING OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER (1983); Michael McConville &
Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 581 (1986-87); LISA J. McINTYRE, THE PUaLC DEFENDER: Ti PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE
SHADOWS OF REPUTE (1987); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to
Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1239 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial As Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the
Adversarial Criminal Process- A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposalfor
Reform, 32 AM. CRim. L. REv. 743 (1995); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Randy A. Hertz, The Ethical
Dilemmas of Public Defenders in Impact Litigation, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE (1986).
3. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense:
Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choicefor all
Criminal Defendants, 31 Am. CRuM. L. Rv (1993).
4. See, e.g., John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1215
(1994); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defenderfor the 21' Century, 58 WTR
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (1995); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player:
Alternating Visions of the Public Defender, 84 Georgetown L.J. 2419 (1996)(hereinafter
"Alternating Visions").
*
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ticipating in the development of criminal justice policy, chief defenders
essentially have disengaged themselves from the public dialogue about
crime. They have retreated into a holding pattern, absorbing rather than
openly challenging reductions in their funding. Wedged between competing obligations to clients and funding authorities, chief defenders have
narrowly defined their function as controlling the office's operations to
stay within budget guidelines. In a profound sense, chief defenders seem
to have lost their bearings.
To put the point differently, chief defenders need to break out of
these bounded conceptions of their roles. For too long, they have isolated themselves and their offices from the center of activity on issues of
crime. Sweeping changes in the welfare system and cuts in services to
poor people throughout the country have weakened the social safety net
for economically subordinated communities. Predictably, as the legal
problems of poor people continue to mount, they will increasingly turn to
public defender offices for help. Chief defenders, therefore, can no
longer be content to preserve the status quo. They must re-imagine their
roles if they intend to address the growing-and ever-changing-needs
of their clients. By recognizing the power that accompanies collaboration and cooperation, they may be able at once to advance their clients'
interests and shape policy in ways rarely tried by defender offices.
I.

ENHANCING THE CHIEF DEFENDER'S EFFICACY WITHIN
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

A.

The Context in Which the Chief Defender Functions:
The Fiscal Crisis

In the years immediately following Gideon v. Wainwright,5 public
defender offices enjoyed a largely hospitable funding environment, perhaps for the only time in their history. 6 An infusion of capital from local
governments enabled public defender offices to open and expand in the
early 1960s.' Although the criminal justice system demanded that public
defender offices handle a volume of cases that often outpaced their
resources, these offices had access to grants and discretionary funds to
supplement their budgets.' Even then, the general public and politicians
questioned the legitimacy of the defender's role and, at times, lacked
5.
6.
7.
SHELDON

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
See generally Kim Taylor-Thompson, Alternating Visions, supra note 4.
See NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, THE OTmER FACE OF JusTIcE 13 (1973);
KRANrz ET AL., RIGHT To CoUNsEL nI CRmINAL CAsEs: THE MANDATE OF A RGERSIAGER

v. HAMLJv 202 (1976).

8. See generally, KRANrZ

ET AL.,

supra note 7.
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sympathy for the offices' mission to defend guilty and unpopular clients. 9 But the Supreme Court's mandate to provide counsel seemed to
temper political discontent over the function of defense counsel. So the
government could direct resources to basic defense needs, at least at that
moment.
The moment passed. Indeed, the financial plight of defender offices
grew worse over time. As the political and economic climate of the
country shifted in the 1980s and 1990s and the country witnessed rising
crime rates, the electorate openly expressed anger about the government's apparent inability to control crime effectively. In the midst of this
heightened tension over crime, budgets for defender offices came under
fire. Although the public had supported efforts to protect the rights of
the accused in the 1960s and 1970s, public outcry over the neglect of the
interests of crime victims inspired legislative initiatives affecting the
criminal justice system.1 ° Legislators now not only had license but also
visible and vocal encouragement to steer resources toward law enforcement and away from indigent defense. Coinciding with this political
shift, the courts began to subordinate the interests of the individual
accused of a crime to the systemic goal of crime control.
This change in perspective translated politically into a rise in
resources available to the enforcement side of the criminal justice equation. 2 Expansions in budgets for law enforcement agencies, prosecutors' offices and corrections on the state and local level accompanied an
increased availability of federal grants for both state and federal prosecutors to fight crime. 13 As a result, prosecutors' offices enjoyed improved
funding in the 1980s and early 1990s with greater access to supplemental
funds. Simultaneously, state and local governments faced shortfalls in
revenue, caps on property taxes and substantial budget deficits. The
9. See generally, id.
10. See, e.g., Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub.L.No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.)(permitting pretrial detention, mandatory
minimum sentencing and fee forfeitures).
11. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 476 U.S. 649, 651 (1984)(adopting "public safety"
exception to Miranda v. Arizona); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984)(establishing
good-faith exception to Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
12. In Fiscal Year 1990, for example, while seventy-four billion dollars were spent by federal,
state and local governments on the justice system, 42.8% went to police, 33.6% to corrections,
12.5% to the courts, 7.4% to prosecution. Public defense pulled up the rear, receiving 2.3% of the
overall justice budget. See RICHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENOERO, TE INDIGENT DEENSE
Cmss 1 (1993)(prepared for the American Bar Association Section of Criminal Justice Ad Hoc
Committee on Indigent Defense Crisis).
13. See Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render
the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363 (1993).

202

JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 2:199

financial decline forced state and local governments to make difficult
choices about funding priorities.' 4 While politicians may have been
somewhat apprehensive about the electorate's reaction to budget cuts in
services such as schools and hospitals, there were no such concerns when
it came to attacking the piece of the fiscal pie reserved for defenders.' 5
Public defenders represented a constituency comprised of the unpopular
16
and often dangerous members of our society who could neither vote
nor wield power in traditional ways. Without either an effective lobby or
a strong independent political base, defender offices became prime
targets for the government's fiscal axe.
Budgets shrank, but caseloads did not. Because of an escalation in
arrests and prosecutions of defendants, criminal cases began to flood the
court system. As fees, billed by members of the bar who were appointed
to cases, began to skyrocket, state and local governments as well as
courts turned increasingly toward public defender offices to handle the
additional cases within a prescribed and severely limited budget. Denied
the funding necessary to hire enough lawyers and often subjected to hiring freezes for the replacement of lawyers who left the office, public
defender offices simply operated on overload.17 As might be expected,
reactions to this crisis among defender offices varied. Some chief
defenders were more politicized. As they began to rethink their role and
tactics in this unsympathetic environment, some chief defenders tentatively formed coalitions to fight for increased budgets.1 8 Other chief
defenders could not effectively resist the assignment of more cases than
their offices could handle. Their offices found themselves drowning in
cases with scarce funds available to assist them in handling the basic
aspects of representation.1 9
14. See, e.g., Richard McGahey, Response, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 259, 262
(1986) (noting that since budget pressures in the 1980s forced the federal government to reduce
nutritional aid to mothers and newborn infants, increases to indigent defense seemed unlikely).
15. See generally, KLEiN & SPANGENBERG, supra note 12.
16. All states except four deprive convicted felons of the right to vote. In 13 states, most if not
all felony convictions result in the loss of voting privileges for life. See, e.g., Alice E. Harvey, ExFelon Disenfranchisementand Its Influence on the Black Vote: The Needfor a Second Look, 142 U.
PA. L. REv. 1145 (1994).
17. See, e.g., Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 3, at 85 (discussing the reasons that the great
majority of public defender systems are understaffed and underfunded); Mark Hansen, P.D.Funding
Struck Down, A.B.A.J., May 1992 at 18 (noting that caseload in Orleans Indigent defense program
prevented lawyers from providing effective assistance of counsel).
18. See KLIEN & SPANGENBERG, supra note 12, at 32 (citing Missouri and Ohio as states
whose defender offices worked with broad-based task forces to obtain improvements for indigent
defense).
19. See, e.g., The Spangenberg Group, Overview of the Fulton County, Georgia Indigent
Defense System (1990)(on file with JOURNAL OF THE IsrrrtrE FOR THE STUDY OF LEGAL
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B. Reconceptualizing the Defender's Role in the Legislative Process
Chief defenders have, perhaps understandably, become preoccupied
with funding. To the virtual exclusion of all other tasks, they have
devoted their energies and creative talents to securing adequate budgets
for their offices. Yet in doing so, chief defenders have essentially misread what it takes to maneuver successfully in the political environment.
Legislative funding decisions inherently and inevitably involve trade-offs
in which politicians make choices between relative priorities, rival constituencies and vocal political groups. Predictably, whether chief defenders seek financing from the city, county or state government, they must
compete with other more popular-or at least less controversial-entities
for a piece of the limited fiscal pie.2 ° In a political arena that thrives on
exchange relationships, chief defenders have chosen not to barter.
Rather than cultivating common bonds that might serve their offices and
their clients, they have drawn seemingly impenetrable boundaries
between themselves, other criminal justice entities, and the communities
in which they operate. Perhaps they have intended to position themselves
above the political fray. Instead, they have actually taken themselves out
of the game.
A variety of factors have converged to produce defenders' budget
difficulties, not all of them within chief defenders' control. Still, focusing on those which they can shape, twin variables emerge. First, chief
defenders have relied on important, but largely unpersuasive, reasons for
increasing their funding. Arguing lofty constitutional principles has
rarely moved politicians who base their careers on popular polls. This
leads to the second problem: chief defenders have chosen to engage the
political system as lone warriors. Although they have certainly appreciated the need to leverage legislators to address their needs, they have,
nonetheless, failed to align themselves with allies who might help them
exert such pressure.
Let us turn first to how chief defenders have framed the problem of
funding. A standard argument has involved raising equal protection
claims in an effort to appeal to legislators' senses of equality. Chief
Ermcs)(finding the defender office near collapse as a result of case overload and grossly inadequate
funding); see also Peter Appelbome, Study FaultsAtlanta's System of Defending Poor, N.Y. TmIEs,
Nov. 30, 1990, at B5.
20. See, e.g., John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, supra note 4, at 1215
(observing that since the public does not even allocate money to its deserving poor, it is "unlikely to
rally behind the protection of those it perceives are preying upon it"); Suzanne E. Mounts Mitchell &
Richard J. Wilson, Systems for Providing Indigent Defense: An Introduction, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 193, 200 (1986) (noting that "providing free lawyers to accused criminals is one of the
government's least popular functions").
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defenders have pointed out that the wealthy defendant, unlike his indigent counterpart, can purchase comprehensive defense representation to
level the playing field between the state and the defense. Even before
her counsel utters her first words in the courtroom, the wealthy client
tends to have an edge that the indigent client does not. But in a political
environment, these arguments have failed. This is not because they lack
merit. The disparity in representation afforded the wealthy and the indigent deserves attention. Yet, the American public has consistently
demonstrated its willingness to tolerate vast disparities between the rich
and the poor. A certain perverse logic permits us to accept and condone
the notion that, in a capitalist society, the rich should enjoy certain
advantages. By urging that our legal system attempt to equalize services
between rich and poor, perhaps chief defenders have ignored the extent
to which the suggestion smacks of socialism or simply seems inconsistent with the "American Dream."
Chief defenders also have argued the moral imperative of funding
public defender offices in order to help the poor. But again this appeal
misses the mark. It is not at all obvious that the way to help the poor is
to pay more for lawyers. More importantly, in a world in which the
public subjects every expenditure to tremendous scrutiny, legislators may
prefer to direct spending for the poor in ways that will not compromise
the appearance of being tough on crime. They may opt to assist the
"deserving poor" rather than those who seem less worthy-indigent
criminals. In the end, chief defenders' arguments rarely gather much support and more often fail to have their desired impact.
The second variable raises the greatest concern. Chief defenders
have consistently chosen to operate independently in the political realm.
But maneuvering without either a constituency or allies is risky at best.
As most chief defenders quickly realize, they cannot influence political
decisions in standard ways. Only in a few jurisdictions will chief public
defenders represent a district as elected officials.2 1 More significantly,
the communities for which chief defenders speak are indigent and often
disenfranchised by law. Without the power of wealth or even the vote to
pose a political threat, public defenders have little hope of moving politicians in new directions. Moreover, given the ways in which chief
defenders have divorced themselves from the neighborhoods in which
21. Chief public defenders in Florida, San Francisco, California, and in parts of Nebraska and
Tennessee are elected. See ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG & PATrICtA A. SMrrH, AN INTRODUCTION To
INDiGENT DEFENSE SYsTEMs 9 (American Bar Association, 1986); Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D.
Friedman, supra note 3, at 84 (1993)(discussing the compromises that elected defenders have made
to assure victory).
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they operate, supporters in those communities may not be easily located.
If chief defenders chose to forge coalitions with other entities in the
criminal justice system, they might build a constituency that would offer
considerable leverage. Chief defenders might then be better able to press
political leaders to respond to their interests rather than being in the
unenviable position of relying on politicians' largesse.
Of course, collaboration with other actors in the system is far from
easy. To do this successfully, chief defenders would need to curb their
institutional instincts to observe and defer to adversarial boundaries. Far
too often, the antagonistic relations that serve clients at the trial level
inform chief defenders' management decisions as well. Out of habit,
chief defenders position themselves on the margins and often fail to nurture or even recognize joint interests with other entities in the justice
system. But for all their familiarity, these adversarial impulses may, in
the end, prove to be a trap. Unless chief defenders can recognize that
they operate in a marketplace that tolerates and builds on "exchange relationships,"22 they will overlook opportunities to find new ways to work
more effectively on behalf of their clients.
One possible outcome of such a collaboration might be that chief
defenders would perceive new strategies for ensuring sufficient funding
for their offices. They might recognize that collaboration with other
criminal justice players would afford opportunities for persuasive arguments that the criminal justice system operates in tandem: each arm of
the system relies on the other.23 For example, appropriations that permit
the hiring of more assistant district attorneys necessarily result in a
greater number of cases prosecuted. If funding authorities fail to provide
the defense with proportionate support to enable them to increase their
staffing, the existing number of defenders must absorb the additional
caseload. The net impact of such one-sided funding is overload in the
defender office. This ultimately slows the progress of the system as a
whole, deprives the accused of adequate protections of her individual
rights,2 4 and may lead to an increased number of appeals based on inef22. See George F. Cole, The Decision to Prosecute, 4 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 331, 332
(1970)(describing the legal system as a market with interorganizational exchange relationships); cf
John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, supra note 4, at 1235 (questioning whether the
legal system operates with sufficient rationality to be considered a marketplace).
23.

SPECIAL COMM. ON CRMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SoclrY, ABA, CRmINAL JusTrcE IN

Cusis 39 (1988).
24. See, e.g., Low-Bid Criminal Defense Contracting: Justice in Retreat, THE CHAPoION,
November 1997, at 10 (discussing national crisis in public defender case overload as routinely
causing violations of ethical obligations to clients); Patrick Noaker, It Doesn't Come with the
Territory: Public Defenders Must Decline to Violate Legal & Ethical Standards in the Face of
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fective assistance of counsel. 25 The interdependence of the prosecutor's
office and the public defender's office seems obvious, yet chief defenders have typically approached the funding process as if the two players
were wholly separate and distinct.
C. Implementing the New Approach
1. Fine-Tuning the Legislative Agenda
Let's assume that chief defenders choose to approach their funding
dilemma by refocusing legislators' attention on the budget for the prosecutor's office. In rationing criminal justice appropriations, political leaders predictably pit defender offices against other institutions in which
they can readily locate their own electoral interests. The police department will protect its constituents against criminals. The courts will
secure justice for victims. Typically, in a contest with their institutional
counterparts chief defenders recognize that the political winds will tend
to favor prosecutors. Legislators see them as using the tools of the legal
system to control crime. While each of these entities presents political
leaders with opportunities to advance crime fighting policies, the prevailing narrative casts public defenders as thwarting that agenda. But,
instead of using the prosecutor's office as a trade-off, suppose chief
defenders enabled legislators to see public defenders and prosecutors as
mutually dependent parts of an ecosystem.
What then? The chief defender might, for example, propose connecting both offices' budgets by statute. A link could be developed such
that the public defender office would receive a fixed percentage of the
prosecutors' budget. If the goal of chief defenders is to reduce the likelihood that politicians will target defender office budgets for cuts, tying
them to the prosecutors' office might shield them from attack. Moreover,
since prosecutors' offices enjoy better funding than defenders' offices,2 6
connecting the budgets might produce increased funding for defenders'
offices-particularly if the statute mandated automatic adjustments to the
defenders' budgets upon any increase to the prosecutors' budgets. Interestingly, this linkage might force policy makers to think about the sysRising Caseloads, 10 SuM CRAM. JUsT. 14, 16 (1995) (noting that defendants' rights are violated due
to case overload).
25. See, e.g., Rodger Citron, Note, (Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunction
to Improve Indigent Defense Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481,491(1991); John Van de Kamp, The Right
to Counsel: Constitutional Imperatives in Criminal Cases, 19 Loy. LA. L. REv. 329, 330
(1985)(noting increasing frequency of complaints about incompetence of counsel).
26. See generally KLEIN & SPANGENBERG, supra note 12. Indeed, the nation's spending on
defense services pales in comparison to the expenditure on prosecution and enforcement.
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tem-wide impact of their funding choices, making the process more
comprehensive and somewhat less divisive.
Here is how the funding scheme would operate. In arriving at the
appropriate formula, the defender's office would calculate the percentage
of indigent criminal cases it handles in relation both to other defense
providers and the prosecutor's office. Defenders' offices often do not
serve as the sole provider of indigent defense services in a given jurisdiction. They commonly share responsibility for the indigent criminal
caseload with contract providers, 2 7 court-assigned counsel, 28 and, in a
growing number of jurisdictions, alternative institutional defenders'
offices.2 9 Thus, the budget ultimately allocated the defender's office

would have to reflect the average percentage of the indigent caseload that
it carried.3 °
Similarly, the funding scheme would not allot equal funds between
the defender's and prosecutor's offices. Prosecutors handle cases that
never result in formal charges and, consequently, do not affect the
defender's office. Also, the prosecutor's budget covers institutional
functions that again do not directly match indigent defense services. For
example, in many jurisdictions, prosecutors expend a large percentage of
time presenting cases before grand juries. Typically, defender's offices
play no role at this stage of the criminal process. 3 1 Likewise, district
attorneys' offices prosecute a percentage of cases that do not involve
indigent defendants and would have no impact on the defender's office.
So, the public defender's office should tie its budget request to that portion of the district attorney's budget that directly relates to the prosecution of criminal cases involving an indigent accused.
For the sake of simplicity, let's assume that a district attorney's
office receives a budget of $100,000 per fiscal year. Of the total number
27. The contract model of indigent defense involves the government entering into a contract
with a lawyer, a group of lawyers, a bar association or a non-profit organization that will provide
representation to indigent clients. See Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent
Defense Systems in the United States, 58 WTR LAW & CowraMaP. PROBs. 31, 32 (1995).
28. Under an assigned counsel model, courts appoint private lawyers from a list or on an ad
hoc basis to represent indigent clients in criminal cases. See id.
29. Alternate defender offices are being established to handle cases in which the principal
institutional defender office has a conflict of interest. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Alternating
Visions, supra note 4, at 2439.
30. Such a legislative scheme exists in Tennessee. Adopted in 1992, the state statute instructs
funding authorities that the defender office will receive 75% of the budget allotted the district
attorneys' office. See T.C.A. Section 16-2-518.
31. Federal defender offices, though, may have some interaction with grand juries. See
generally CHARLES D. WEISSELBERG, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF SAN DIEGO, INC., DEFENDING A
FEDERAL CASE (1986).
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of cases it prosecutes, approximately 75% involve indigent defendants.
We should then further assume that the defender's office handles 80% of
the indigent caseload in that jurisdiction, with private appointed counsel
representing the remaining 20% of cases. In its most basic formulation,
the legislative proposal might require that the statutory link reflect the
relative number of cases each office handles. This would give the
defender's office a budget of approximately 60% of the prosecutor's
budget or $60,000. Alternatively, legislators might require that the district attorney's office identify the percentage of its budget associated
with prosecuting those cases. The matching formula would then give the
defender's office 75% of that amount.
In refining this formula, a jurisdiction might, of course, choose
other measures for determining the real expenditure of resources. For
example, although 75% of the prosecutor's caseload involves indigent
defendants, this figure may not adequately capture the actual expenditure
of time and money. A prosecutor's office may devote more resources to
complex conspiracy cases or to cases involving mandatory sentencing
schemes that simply will not be reflected in the raw numbers of cases
processed by the office. Or the defender's office may demand a larger
percentage of the prosecution budget to account for in-kind, investigative
resources that prosecutors receive from police departments.3" In implementing the statutory formula, therefore, defenders and prosecutors may
make adjustments that take into account the actual operations of each of
the offices. But the initial inquiry would still involve applying a formula
that recognizes the interrelation between the two entities. By developing
such a scheme, defenders' offices might, in the end, make the funding
process less polarized.
2.

Advancing the Legislative Agenda

To enact the statutory change needed to implement the foregoing
proposal, chief defenders would have to enter the political fray. At a
minimum, they would need to lobby local legislators. While such a campaign might seem obvious to any other body intent on advancing a political agenda, public defenders tend not to engage in such strategies.
Instead, to the extent that they weigh in on legislation, they often react to
items that have already been proposed, offering comments and suggesting changes in language rather than devising collaborative efforts to
defeat it. Rarely will defenders take the lead in mobilizing a team to
32. See, e.g., David Luban, Are Criminal Lawyers Different?, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 173236 (1993)(noting the "investigative free ride" that the prosecution enjoys as a result of investigations
conducted by the police department).
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advance a legislative proposal. Public defenders tend to approach political issues as an isolated voice.3 3 But given the politics involved in
changing the legislature's approach to funding defenders' offices, chief
defenders' cannot hope to accomplish this goal alone.
Uncovering and building upon mutual concerns would undoubtedly
be difficult. It would require sophisticated and sustained work along
unchartered frontiers: the ideological dividing lines between institutions.
Indeed, chief defenders might resist attempts to develop coalitions, for
fear that they may be expected to compromise or sacrifice fundamental
interests of their clients to maintain the alliance. But chief defenders
should come to see that acknowledging differences may be a healthy
reaction to this process.34 With a clear sense of their institutional mission, chief defenders could make judgments about trade-offs that their
offices could abide and about the acceptability of proposals brought to
the negotiation table by these other actors in the system. In the short run,
this cooperation might promote passage of this legislation. Equally
important, by aligning interests with other criminal justice actors, the
chief defender might set the stage for future collaborative efforts.
The chief defender might begin by enlisting the support of the local
courts. Chief defenders could appeal to the courts' interests in moving
their calendars more efficiently. When defenders cannot adequately staff
or prepare cases, they may be compelled by their ethical obligations to
request postponements of hearings in order to have adequate time to
assess a plea offer or to prepare a defense.35 With sufficient funding, the
percentage of such requests could decrease, allowing courts to process
cases more efficiently. Of course, in lobbying the courts, chief defenders
could encounter a perverse-and unstated-dynamic. Courts may, in one
sense, benefit from an underfunded defender's office. 36 The competing
demands of large numbers of clients often force defenders' offices to
limit the number of cases they take to trial and to resolve the overwhelm33. Having engaged in various projects offering technical assistance to public defender offices
across the country, I have found that public defenders often see their issues as unique. To the extent
that they engage in lobbying, they tend to act independently. Accord, MclrrRE, supra note 1, at
73.
34. See GERALD P. L61PEz, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING 373-374 (1992)(cautioning against
ignoring differences among groups in coalition-building).
35. See, e.g., MODEL Rui..s OF PROFESSIONAL CoNucr Rule 1.4(b)(1994) (requiring that "[a]
lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REspoNsamtrry
EC 7-8 (stating that a lawyer "should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are
made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations").
36. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 60 (1997).
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ing majority through guilty pleas. So, the chief defender would need to
anticipate this unspoken reality perhaps by appealing to the judges' interests in maintaining the public's confidence in the legitimacy of the justice system. If the courts are perceived to be poorly managed, trust in the
justice system could diminish. Particularly in jurisdictions where judges
run for election, they would likely have a strong self-interest in being
perceived as effective and efficient ministers of justice.
The chief prosecutor would also be key. Although many defenders
would view the prosecutor as the least attractive ally, such a partnership
could fundamentally shift the balance of interests in favor of this statute's passage. Of course, teaming up with an institutional adversary
requires caution and careful planning. But for all its challenges, the chief
defender would face considerable difficulty succeeding in this legislative
strategy with opposition from the district attorney's office. One possible
bridge to this collaboration might involve appealing to the prosecutor's
interest in resolving cases-a goal both institutions share. Without sufficient resources to investigate a case, a defender would experience difficulty evaluating the strengths or weaknesses of a given case. Unless she
could amass sufficient information about the government's case, an individual defender could not ethically counsel a client about the advisability
of proceeding to trial or disposing of a case through a plea agreement.3 7
Ensuring adequate funding for the defender's office might enable the
chief defender to devote greater resources to an investigation to supply
this information to her lawyers and their clients. In the end, higher funding levels could move cases through the system in a more timely manner.
If the district attorney's office ultimately refuses to engage in this
collaboration and to back the legislation, the chief defender could consider approaching the local bar association for support in persuading the
prosecutors. A bar committee could commission a study of the impact of
prosecutorial policies on the cost of indigent defense. As other such
studies have shown, the costs of defenders' and prosecutors' offices are
fundamentally intertwined. 38 The prosecutor's office may regard the
37. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsrONSmiLrry EC 7-8 (stating that a lawyer
"should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client has
been informed of relevant considerations"); MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule
1.4(b)(1994) (requiring that "[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation) and Rule 1.1 (requiring
that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation").
38. In 1989 in Oregon, I participated in such a study along with two other members of an
investigating team: a chief prosecutor from North Carolina and a trial judge from the District of
Columbia. After a series of on-site interviews and a review of records and procedures, we concluded
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statute as a preferable alternative to the scrutiny that such a study would
produce.
The coalition would then approach the legislature. No longer would
the chief defender need to resort to the standard arguments for funding
that are so easily rejected. Proceeding as one voice among other
respected voices in the criminal justice system, the chief defender would
have less difficulty being heard. Her former institutional competitors
would now be enmeshed in a supportive relationship with the chief
defender. The coalition would not only provide the chief defender with
needed insulation in the heated political debate about funding but could
similarly serve as cover for a reluctant legislator. She would be able to
justify her decision to support such legislation because every key player
agrees that the system requires such a statute.
Of course, this is but one example of cooperation. Still, if chief
defenders would take the time to reconsider their approaches to this process and reach out to other entities in the system, they might discover
other ways to improve their efficacy in the legislative arena.
Although the funding process offers an illustration of the shortcomings of acting as solo players, equally troubling examples emerge when
we examine the chief defenders' roles with respect to the communities in
which they operate. Part II will address this topic and offer some suggestions for increasing chief defenders' involvement with their
communities.
II.

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY-ORIENTED ROLE
FOR THE CHIEF DEFENDER

A.

Challenging Prevailing Notions of the Chief Defender's Role

Chief defenders have tended to presume that maintaining a public
profile invites confrontation.3 9 Given the volatility of crime, this is not
surprising. The general public reserves its most visceral reactions for
individuals accused of crimes and, of course, for their lawyers.' And
because the most vocal representatives of communities on issues of
crime will often be victims' rights advocates, chief defenders tend to
equate communities' interests with those of victims. Accordingly,
that the cost of indigent defense had skyrocketed, in part, because of certain charging practices by
the prosecutor's office. As a result of this review, the prosecutor's office became the focus of
intense political scrutiny and the indigent defense providers received additional funding.
39. See MclNrrsxa, supra note 1, at 72-73.
40. See, e.g., SPEcIA. Comm. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SocIETY, ABA, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN CRISIS 37, supra note 23 (finding "it is clear that those who represent the poor are not
generally held in high esteem, either within the legal profession or outside it.")
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defenders draw dividing lines. But perhaps better than others, defenders
should understand that the boundary between victim and accused is
fluid.4 1 Economically and racially-subordinated communities often experience higher rates of crime, making it more likely that residents will
become victims of crime. 4 2 As importantly, residents in those communities often have greater interaction with law enforcement, increasing the
likelihood that many of the same individuals will be stopped, detained or
arrested in their lifetimes.4 3 Given this relationship, the chief defenders'
choice to erect walls between themselves and communities is far from
self-evident.
Staff lawyers in defenders' offices often reach out to the larger community. Representing their clients' interests fully requires that defenders
frequently rely on the assistance of other actors outside of the defender
community. For example, when clients have unstable living circumstances, individual public defenders will often reach out to local social
agencies at the pretrial stage to find housing or meals for clients until
they can manage on their own. 4 Or defenders may enlist the assistance
of churches or community-based treatment facilities to ease their clients'
transitions back into neighborhoods after periods of incarceration.4 5
Although these activities do not technically assist their clients in litigating claims in court, they have become essential components of individual
representation. Knowing this, chief defenders might logically fashion
their roles as extensions of this work: developing partnerships with communities to create less retributive approaches to the problem of crime.
Instead, chief defenders tend to keep communities at arms' length as they
have historically done.46
Perhaps this is to be expected. Like other public executives, chief
defenders have learned not to stray substantially from their legislative
mandate. Society tends to maintain different expectations of public
41. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, The Politics of Common Ground, 111 HAv. L. REv. 1306,
1310 (1998).
42. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRtME, AND THE LAW 19 (1998).
43. See Marc Mauer & Tracy Huling, Young Black Americans and the Criminal Justice
System: Five Years Later (The Sentencing Project, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 1995 at 1 (finding that
one in three African American men between the ages of 20 and 29 is under criminal justice
supervision on any given day); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT (1995)(discussing some of the
reasons for the high incidence of arrests of African Americans in this country).
44. See, e.g., CRIMINAL PeAcricti TRIAL MANUAL SECTION 10 (1996)(Listing resources
programs as alternatives to incarceration).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Harold R. Washington & Geraldine S. Hines, "Call My Lawyer": Styling a
Comunity Based Defender Program,8 BLACK L.J. 186, 188 (1983)(discussing the establishment of
an alternative defender program in Roxbury, Massachusetts to "be responsive to community needs").
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administrators than executives in private firms. While corporate culture
encourages and rewards imagination and initiative, we as a society often
47
perceive those very qualities as dangerous in public sector executives.
Of course, in the private sector, the marketplace operates as a ready measure of whether executive decisions have produced the desired economic
benefits. But because decisions by public managers are not so easily
assessed and may be slower to produce tangible results, we tend to rely
on mechanisms outside of market forces to hold public managers
accountable. Legislatures seek to guide and limit the discretion of public
managers by restricting them to specified goals.4 8 Theoretically, this
restraint of the public sector executive reduces the potential for corruption and abuse of power. For all its well-intentioned caution, though, this
limitation encourages public managers to become the worst sorts of
bureaucrats-focusing more on being organizational caretakers than
innovative leaders.
When we examine the role of chief public defenders, this dynamic
becomes apparent.4 9 While legislators recognize a governmental obligation to provide counsel to indigent defendants, they often seek to buy this
service at the lowest possible price.5" In their efforts to factor such
resource constraints into operational decisions, chief defenders find
themselves oriented downward, attempting to serve their client base
while at the same time controlling their operations in ways that satisfy
legislative overseers. But chief defenders seem not to appreciate that by
shifting their orientation outward toward the communities in which they
operate, they might mobilize support for renegotiating those legislative
policy objectives. They might also dislodge themselves from the administrative box in which they have been placed. More importantly still,
through sustained and interactive dialogue with other entities and individuals in the community, chief defenders might discover an evolving
mission that could move them beyond their traditional mandate and conceptions of themselves.
That's not just fancy talk. Other actors in the criminal justice system
have already seized this opportunity. Police departments across the country have been experimenting with new forms of crime prevention that
47.

See MARK H. MOORE, CEATING PUBLIC VALUE:

GovaEiRaEr

STRATEGIC

MANAGEMENT

IN

19 (1995).

48. See id. at 32.
49. See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 3, at 85 (noting that most chief defenders temper
their activities "with pragmatic instincts for bureaucratic survival").
50. See William J. Stuntz, supra note 36, at 23.
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employ community-based models.5 1 Prosecutors' offices have begun to
recognize the need to maintain, or in some instances, develop or repair
In some jurisdictions, the judiciary has
relations with communities.5
taken an active role in developing drug courts and youth courts, and has
even worked with ministers and other sectors of their communities to
address recurring problems in a more global way.53 One might expect
chief defenders to be at the forefront of this trend. Instead, they trail the
pack.
In assessing the effectiveness of their choice to withdraw from communities, chief defenders might ask whether they can or should play a
broader role in serving their client base. They might begin by examining
what it ultimately means to defend the public. Perhaps the most important component of the role will always be the defense of the clients
assigned to the defender's office. But by broadening the focus of their
own mission, chief defenders might see advantages to working with their
geographic communities as well as with their client communities. In turn,
communities might benefit from chief defenders' experiences with criminal justice issues. Defenders' vantage points in the criminal justice system often provide them with critical insights about those accused of
crime. For example, representing individuals who are the targets of
criminal justice policy initiatives enables public defenders to recognize
the benefits and limits of these strategies. By hearing clients recount
their experiences with punitive sanctions, intermediate approaches and
rehabilitative strategies, defenders gain insights, that often escape policymakers, about the reasons why such strategies succeed or fail. To the
extent that lawyers communicate this knowledge, they may share it
within the defender community or perhaps include it in an individual
case before a sentencing judge. But this information might better be
used to inform criminal justice policies at a systemic level.
Of course, chief defenders ought to proceed cautiously in expanding
their role. Without the clarity provided by the office's specific mandate,
chief defenders risk the disapproval of legislative authorities or the wrath
of the voting public if they engage in activities that seem far removed
from the functions they have traditionally performed. In a comprehen51.

See generally, JERoME H.

SKOLIRCK

INNOVATION IN SIx AMiRIcAN CITIES

& DAVID H.

BAYLEY, THE NEw BLUE LINE: POLICE

(1986).

52. See, e.g., Julie Goodman, Prevention Effort Puts Law Enforcers in Classroom,
PROVIDENcE J., Jan. 27, 1999, at 2C; Ralph C. Martin, Franklin Hill Turnaround, BOSTON GLOBE,
March 8, 1998, at D7.
53. See, e.g., Warren Richey, Drug Courts: More Evidence They Reduce Repeat Offenses,
THE CmusTtAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 19, 1997, at 1; Consella A. Lee, Teen Court Considered By
Committee, BALT. SUN, June 25, 1997, at IB (discussing experiments with youth courts in 35 states).
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sive examination of the role of public managers, Mark Moore of the
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University has proposed
three criteria to guide the manager in undertaking projects that extend her
reach beyond legislative constraints. 5" Although Moore does not directly
address the role of public defenders, his "strategic triangle" may prove
helpful.5 5 First, he recommends that the selected strategy be substantively valuable. It must be seen either as producing an important "product" or helping to solve an otherwise intractable problem that has been of
concern to funding authorities, clients and their communities. Second,
the program must be politically sustainable. Finally, the activities in
which the public manager chooses to engage must be operationally feasible. The chosen problem need not be solved, but the public manager's
efforts must be seen as helping to address it or to develop a better understanding of its nature.
Integrating Moore's insights, one must ask what activities a chief
defender might adopt that would likely produce something of value to
the communities in which they operate. If, as chief defenders contend,
those same communities perceive them as the source of their problems
rather than as helping to identify answers, chief defenders might not want
to select a strategy that would fuel that impression. Suppose, for example, a chief defender considered organizing a community-based campaign to defeat the death penalty in that jurisdiction. While such an
activity might seem a logical extension of the defender's office's activities, it might be an unwise first step into the community. The political
price may be too high.5 6 Given the controversy surrounding the death
penalty, such a program might only appeal to certain segments of the
community. Vocal members of the electorate might debate the program's value and raise questions about whether the chief defender should
engage in such partisan activities. In the end, such a program might not
be operationally or politically feasible.
Instead, the chief defender might choose a program that has more
widespread support while still reflecting the values of the defender
office. Using Moore's strategic triangle as a guide, the chief defender
might work with community groups to identify their concerns and to find
54. See MooRE, supra note 47.
55. Id. at 22.
56. This is not meant to suggest that a chief defender could never lead a campaign opposing
the death penalty. Certainly, their institutional opponents, district attorneys, are often quite vocal
supporters of capital punishment. But in initially choosing a community-based campaign, chief
defenders would want to take care that the program they embraced would appeal to a broad
constituency, allowing them to have a new presence in the community. Building on the success of
such a program, they might then pursue more "controversial" plans.
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issues on which their views might coincide with those of the defender
office. The next section offers one such problem that the chief defender
might decide to address: gun-related violence within a community. 57
B.

Expanded Visions of the Chief Defender's Role

The story is familiar. Across the country, communities have experienced the related problems of a proliferation of guns and violent crime.
Various local and national policy initiatives have attempted to curb gunrelated violence, but typically with limited success. Assuming that a
defender office is situated in an urban area that has endured its share of
gun-related deaths and injuries, what role might a chief defender play?
The traditional responses are well-known. A chief defender would make
it possible for her lawyers to represent individuals who might face gun
charges. On a broader scale, the chief defender might choose to challenge proposed legislation that increases penalties for weapons offenses.
But if chief defenders wish to have a greater impact within their communities, these need not be their only options.
Suppose instead that chief public defenders begin to include community concerns in their mission. This would necessitate conceiving of
themselves as part of their communities and might require that they
engage in outreach activities that rarely occur in the isolated environment
that defenders typically create. The chief defender might meet with
members of the community to discuss issues of crime, or she might regularly attend church or town meetings that address the crime problems in
the neighborhood. In conjunction with members of the community, the
chief defender might begin to explore ideas for reducing the level of
violence within the various communities that make up the affected neighborhoods. Interestingly, in attempting to gather this information, the
chief defender might gain access to communities broader in scope than,
for example, those which the Chief of Police or District Attorney might
tap. Because of defenders' unique abilities to speak with those who actually possess weapons, the chief defender might be able to offer suggestions for creating the type of incentive that would induce someone to
refrain from such activities.
57.

This example grows out of a community-based effort in northern California. See Donna

Wasiczko, Gun Amnesty Program Plannedfor Richmond, WEST CoUwrY TiMES, Nov. 4, 1991

(describing gun program proposed by Deputy Public Defender Tony Thompson); Donna Wasiczko,
It's Good Business to Help Gun Amnesty Project,Say Sponsors, Wesr CoUNTY TnsES, Jan. 6, 1992
(discussing the joint efforts of business and community groups in supporting gun amnesty program).
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Given the motivations58 that typically lead public defenders to
choose their careers, a chief defender committed to playing a role in
addressing neighborhood crime might want to pursue initiatives that do
not rely on punitive measures to shape behavior. Instead, the chief
defender might suggest positive incentive structures. If we imagine that
in the course of these discussions that most members of the community
agree that removal of guns from their streets represents an important first
step in reducing gun-related violence, the chief defender might recommend initiating a program that offers money in exchange for the surrender of guns. Such a program might appeal to residents of the community
who, for example, worry about guns in their homes and fear the likelihood of either an accidental injury or an intruder's use of the weapon
against them in the course of a crime. It might also attract victims' rights
advocates who would likely want to disarm potential offenders. And
chief defenders might support such a program as providing citizens a
safe haven to surrender guns without the threat of incurring a criminal
record.
Turning next to Moore's criteria, would this program make sense?
It would potentially produce something of value to this community. If
the program could reduce the number of guns available, the neighborhood might experience a decrease in gun-related injuries. This type of
success might also empower the neighborhood to continue seeking and
implementing its own community-based solutions to the problem of
crime. Given the pervasive nature of the problem of gun-related violence,
a program that attempts to reduce the availability of guns could enjoy
wide community acceptance across political lines. Although the chief
defender might have neither the time nor the expertise to administer such
a program, she could serve as instigator and enlist the support and participation of other groups within the target community. By embarking on
this path, the chief defender would assume a different role in the community. She could be seen as working with a community rather than against
it.
Here's how the program might unfold. To encourage the surrender
of as many weapons as possible, anyone possessing a gun would be
granted amnesty from prosecution. The developers of the program would
designate a neutral site for the collection of weapons since an individual
possessing a gun might be reluctant to surrender it to the police department and expose herself to arrest and prosecution. Personnel trained to
handle and collect weapons would need to staff the site with the under58.

See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications,supra note 1.
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standing that they would not question anyone bringing in guns. The program participants would need to solicit funds or products to be
distributed in exchange for the guns. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the program would need to enlist the support of political and community leaders.
To put this initiative into action, the chief defender, along with other
members of the community, might first approach the local police department. Much like the process required for the passage of the budget
amendment, the chief defender would need to identify common concerns
among the proponents of the gun program and law enforcement officials.
Without the agreement of the police, the program could not succeed. So
the chief defender might suggest that the gun program would offer the
department an opportunity to do more than simply patrol communities.
Instead, this program would allow police officers to work with communities in preventing crimes before they occur. To further ensure safety and
reduce the possibility of accidental injuries, off-duty police officers could
volunteer to assist in dismantling the guns at the designated exchange
points.
The local district attorney's participation would, of course, be critical. The chief defender would need to secure her agreement to refrain
from prosecuting anyone exchanging a gun at one of the established
sites. The chief defender might seek prosecutors' endorsements of this
program by suggesting that it offers them an opportunity to protect the
interests of potential victims before violence occurs. Moreover, given
district attorneys' interests in reinforcing relations between their offices
and the communities that elect them, chief defenders should be able to
count on their support. It seems unlikely that the prosecutor would
choose to alienate community groups that have already backed this
program.
Less obvious groups would also fit within this network. The chief
defender might consider approaching the local Chamber of Commerce
for its support. Businesses, such as the telephone, electric and gas companies, that routinely assign employees to work in neighborhoods, might
see this program as a method to provide greater safety for their employees. Similarly, the business community can be encouraged to recognize
that neighborhoods that are free from violence provide environments in
which local businesses can thrive. Thus, companies and banks doing
business in the community could be tapped to donate the products or
money to be given in exchange for the guns. In addition to the business
community, chief defenders might approach churches and synagogues to
serve as neutral ground for the collection of weapons. Hospitals in the
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community or insurers might agree to participate in publicizing the program because a reduction in the availability of guns might lead to a
decrease in the number of gun-related injuries. 5 9
The success of any strategy that attempts to bring public defender
perspectives on policy to light would necessarily depend on an ability to
communicate with the public. Such would be the case with a gun
exchange program. Since chief defenders tend to avoid regular interaction with the media,' they would need to begin cultivating relations with
reporters to ensure favorable coverage of this program. By working with
reporters assigned to the crime beat, offering background on cases, the
chief defender might help produce more balanced coverage of stories on
crime-related subjects. Indeed, the gun exchange program might lead the
media to portray the work of the defender office in a more positive light.
In many ways, a gun exchange program has obvious links to the
defender's role. But other examples might be susceptible to a similar
approach. For example, chief defenders might choose to work with
school systems in developing programs that encourage students to
develop non-violent methods of conflict resolution.6" Recognizing that
individuals who enter the criminal justice system often have failed to
develop adequate coping mechanisms to handle their frustrations,6 2 chief
defenders could be instrumental in devising scenarios that schools and
community programs can use to help students appreciate the range of
non-violent options available in particular situations. Or chief defenders
might work with their communities by organizing a consortium of service providers within the community. Bringing together representatives
from social agencies, churches, the police department and other community groups might enable these providers to share non-confidential information about recurring problems in the community. Through regular
interaction, they might avoid duplication of effort and develop a better
understanding of the roles that each group plays.
In the end, collaborative efforts of this sort would afford the chief
defender the opportunity to become an active participant in the development of community-based solutions to the problem of crime. By no
59. See, e.g., David Satcher, Gunning for Research, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1995, at C2
(defining guns as a public health problem).
supra note 1, at 72-73 (discussing tendency of chief defender to shun
60. See MclrNrVy,
publicity).
61. For example, the Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem expanded the role of its
public defenders to include working with New York high schools in developing such programs.
62. See generally ELLIoTr CuRRIu, CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN AMERICA 103-108
(1998)(discussing 'multisystemic" approaches that work with juvenile offenders as participants in a
range of institutions, from school to family, rather than as isolated individuals with problems).
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means would one program erase all hostility that a community might feel
toward a defender's office. But the program might begin to open a dialogue about other methods of ensuring a community's safety.
CONCLUSION

The expanded role that I have proposed may also place the chief
defender at odds with her own office. Rarely will an individual staff
lawyer view other actors within the criminal justice system as anything
other than adversaries. Although legal academics periodically suggest
that criminal defense lawyers should adopt what they describe as a more
expansive view of their role-one that subordinates the defense of clients
to the overall good of the public 6 3-defense lawyers scoff at such
notions. Instead, they embrace the concept of zealous advocacy and singular devotion to the client's needs. More significantly, defenders tend
to view with suspicion actions by their leadership that smell of collaboration. This suspicion is not baseless. Chief defenders have at times
seemed more concerned with appeasing political authorities than with
ensuring high-quality service for their offices' clients.
The solution to this internal political problem may be to adopt more
collaborative methods within the office. Through open discussion of priorities and plans, the staff may not only come to understand but actually
to embrace the expanded role of the chief defender. In particular, the
fact that individual lawyers may come to appreciate that collaboration
with other criminal justice actors as well as the community does not necessarily mean a diminution of service to clients. Rather, it may broaden
options available to individual defenders in serving their clients.
Any change to the chief defender's role would not be without risk.
Indeed, the ideas presented here are designed to provoke thought and
question. But what might make the changes proposed here attractive to
chief defenders is that they offer defenders an opportunity to break out of
a role that has been increasingly characterized by conciliation and deference to political authorities. More importantly, since chief defenders'
efforts have not always protected their offices' or their clients' interests
sufficiently, this expanded role might give them new strategies for influencing attitudes and policy within the criminal justice system. The challenge for the next century may simply be to recognize that standing still
is not risk free.

63. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 1703
(1993).

